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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION-Fairdale Farm, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc.
Despite the seemingly pervasive reach of United States antitrust
laws,' many sectors of the economy are exempt from their proscrip-
tions.2 Agricultural cooperatives, 3 in particular, have been exempt from
I The primary antitrust laws in the United States are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1976), the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, id §§ 12-27, 44, and § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, id § 45.
2 Pogue, Antitrust Exemptions-Introduction, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Antitrust Exemptions]. Most sectors have received their exemption from Congress. Ma-
jor league baseball is a notable exception, exempt as a result of Supreme Court decisions.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). More than 20% of the nation's private economic
activity, extending to over 20 sectors, is affected by some antitrust exemption. Pogue, The
Rationale of Exemptionsfrom Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 313, 314 (1961). In creat-
ing antitrust exemptions, "Congress has used a great variety of legislative devices. . . . Some
exempt certain types of agreements or specifically described transactions; some relate to the
existence or operation of particular categories of organizations; others provide immunity to
persons who perform certain acts." Id. at 313-14.
The rationales for antitrust exemptions are as varied as the methods for enacting them.
Seven different justifications have been suggested: the disparity of economic power between
persons in the particular category and their competitors, suppliers, or purchasers, see, e.g.,
April v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D. Mass. 1958); a policy of assisting
American businesses in foreign competition, see, e.g., Wcbb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 61-65 (1976); a policy of encouraging certain desired results, see, e.g., Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976); the needs of national defense, see, e.g., Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 708(b) (repealed 1956); maintenance of favorable federal/state
relations, see, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1942); a belief that certain activities
require cooperation among competitors, see, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953); and an aversion to novel or abrupt application of the antitrust laws to activity long
thought immune, see, e.g., id. See generaly Antitrust Exemptions, supra, at 2-3. A national com-
mission recently stated, however, that antitrust exemptions should be created only "where
there is compelling evidence of the unworkability of competition or a clearly paramount so-
cial purpose." I NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCE-
DURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 177 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 REPORT]. Indeed, antitrust immunities have come under increasing scrutiny.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 REPORT]. See generaly Myrter, Where Have All the Exemptions
Gone? Like Old Soldiers, Thq Are Fading Away, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 940 (1978).
3 A cooperative. . . is basically an association organized. . . for the pur-
pose of marketing products produced . . . [by] its members, or purchasing
supplies used by its members. . . . Characteristically, they are non-profit.
Their objectives are to help their members obtain the best price for their
products or effect important savings in the purchase of. . . supplies. Tradi-
tionallj,, these associations are rather closely run and controlled by their mem-
bership. . . . There is seldom any substantial amount of non-member capital
invested in their operation ...
Noakes, Exemption for Cooperatives, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 407, 409 (1961).
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the antitrust laws for over sixty years.4 The scope of the exemption re-
mains unclear,5 however, especially with regard to monopolization and
attempts to monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act.6
In Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc. ,7 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that agricultural cooperatives are not subject to
the same test for unlawful monopolization as are corporations.8 Rather,
an agricultural cooperative is liable for unlawful monopolization only if
it commits predatory acts.9 The court's holding ignores numerous pro-
4 The two principal statutory components of the agricultural cooperative exemption
are § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), and the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.c.
§§ 291-292 (1976).
Section six of the Clayton Act, originally enacted in 1914 (ch. 23, § 6, 38 Stat. 731),
provides that
[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exist-
ence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, insti-
tuted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members ofsuch orga-
nizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). The Capper-Volstead Act, originally enacted in 1922 (ch. 57, § 1-2,
42 Stat. 388), provides in pertinent part:
§ 1: Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farm-
ers, planters, ranchmen, [or] dairymen. . . may act together in associations,
corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively process-
ing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing. . . such products of per-
sons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common;
and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts
and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however, That such associa-
tions are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such
producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements:
First. That no member or association is allowed more than one vote be-
cause of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or mem-
bership capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmem-
bers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for
members.
§ 2: If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any
such association monopolizes or restrains trade. . . to such an extent that the
price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced by reason thereof, he
shall serve. . . a complaint [containing a notice] . . . requiring the associa-
tion to show cause why an order should not be made directing it to cease and
desist from monopolization or restraint of trade ...
7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976); see notes 19-28 and accompanying text infra.
5 "The law relative to agricultural cooperatives can be succinctly described by one
word--uncertainty." Comment, Agicultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws, 43 NEB. L. REv.
73, 103 (1963) (emphasis in original).
6 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). One commentator has described this area of the agricultural
cooperative exemption as an "uncharted sea." Note, Agriultural Cooperatives and the Antitrist
Laws: Clayton, Capper-Volstead, and Common Sense, 44 VA. L. REv. 63, 83 (1958).
7 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981).
8 Id. at 1038-39, 1045; see notes 55 & 61 and accompanying text infra.
9 See 635 F.2d at 1044-45. On predatory pricing, see generally Brodley & Hay, Predatory
1982]
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nouncements to the effect that agricultural cooperatives, once formed,
are to be treated as corporations, and casts aside a longstanding judicial
practice of narrowly interpreting the agricultural cooperative antitrust
exemption.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Agricultural cooperatives developed relatively recently in American
agriculture. Before the 1870s, farmers generally operated as individual
units, competing with each other to market their products.10 By the
1870s, the Grange movement had popularized cooperative marketing of
produce, and after 1890, cooperatives became a firmly established part
of agriculture. 1
The movement to enact a federal antitrust law during this period
raised fears among farm groups that agricultural cooperatives would be
included within its reach. 12 In fact, during debate on the Sherman Act,
Congress considered but did not approve a partial exemption for agri-
cultural cooperatives. 13 Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court
Pricing." Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
738 (1981).
10 Mischler, Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 381, 381 (1958); Note,
Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope ofAntitust Exemptions forAgricultural Coopera-
tives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 341 (1975). Indeed, "early-twentieth-century American farming
epitomized the pure competition model." Id. at 352.
11 Mischler, supra note 10, at 381-82. By the early 1920s there were more than 12,000
marketing associations and approximately 2,100 farm supply associations. Id. For a general
discussion of the growth of agricultural cooperatives, see Hanna, Antitrust Immunities of Coopera-
tive Associations, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488, 488-92 (1948).
The early growth of agricultural cooperatives was hampered because many state courts
held that cooperatives were illegal restraints on trade. See, e.g., Georgia Fruit Exch. v.
Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542 (1913); Bums v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co., 65 Colo.
425, 176 P. 287 (1918); Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-op. Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844
(1913). Contra, Burley Tobacco Soc'y v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N.E. 89 (1912);
Buliville Milk Producers' Ass'n v. Armstrong, 108 Misc. 583, 178 N.Y.S. 612 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
See general'y FARMERS COOPERATIVE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LFEGAL PHASES
OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 265-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL PHASES]. As states
began to pass their own antitrust statutes, however, they provided exemptions for agricultural
cooperatives. See, e.g., 1896 Ga. Laws 68 (1896); 1893 IIl. Laws 182 (1893). See genera4ly LE-
GAL PHASES, supra, at 268-69.
The Supreme Court slowed the enactment of state antitrust exemptions for agricultural
cooperatives by holding that the grant of such an exemption was an unreasonable classifica-
tion in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because agricul-
tural producers were allowed to combine and otherwise restrain trade whereas ordinary
businesses were not. See Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 556-57 (1902).
States, however, continued to adopt such exemptions. See, e.g., 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 613
(1913); 1906 Ky. Acts 429 (1906). See generaly Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. LJ. 353,432 (1952). The Supreme Court eventually overruled Conuolly in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141, 147 (1940).
12 Saunders, The Stats ofAgricultural Cooperatives Under the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 35,
36 (1960).
13 The proposed amendment read as follows: "Provided, That this act shall not be con-
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suggested that agricultural cooperatives would fall within the purview of
the Sherman Act.14
Nevertheless, the period between 1899 and 1919 was a "golden era"
in agriculture.' 5 In 1914, Congress enacted a limited agricultural coop-
erative exemption in section six of the Clayton Act.' 6 The end of a pe-
riod of relative prosperity, unresolved legal questions, and a growing
awareness of the need for agricultural cooperatives led to the passage of
a broader exemption in the Capper-Volstead Act in 1922.1 7 The cur-
rent agricultural cooperative antitrust exemption is based upon these
provisions, as well as their subsequent judicial development.18
A. The Statutogy Bases of the Exemption
The main purpose of section six of the Clayton Act' 9 was not agri-
cultural reform; Congress was more concerned with enabling labor un-
ions to develop unfettered by antitrust sanctions.20 The scant legislative
strued to apply to... any arrangements, agreements, or combinations among persons en-
gaged in horticulture or agriculture made with the view of enhancing the price of agricultural
or horticultural products." 21 CONG. REc. 2611 (1890).
The proposal is significant because its aim was to amend § 1 of the Sherman Act, which
outlawed only agreements, arrangements, and combinations. See id. at 2598. Moreover, the
proposed amendment made no attempt to exempt agricultural cooperatives from the an-
timonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act. It did not appear in the final version of the
Sherman Act. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). Thus, it was contem-
plated even at this early date that although cooperatives would be free to form, they would
not be at liberty to monopolize.
14 See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908) ("The records of Congress show that
several efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers. . . from the
operation of the [Sherman] Act and that all these efforts failed, so that the act remained as we
have it before us.") (dictum).
15 W. GEE, THE SOCIAL ECONOMICs OF AGRICULTURE 72-73 (3d ed. 1954).
16 Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914); see note 4 supra; notes 19-22 & 68-70 and accompa-
nying text infra.
17 Ch. 57, §§ 1-2,42 Stat. 388 (1922); see note 4supra; notes 24-28 & 71-74 and accompa-
nying text infra.
Is Noakes, Antitrust Eemptions: Agdeulturat Cooperatives, 33 ANTrrRusT L.J. 7, 7 (1967).
Other statutes elaborate upon the basic provisions of these two acts. See, e.g., Cooperative
Marketing Act of 1926, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) (providing that agricultural cooperatives may
legally acquire and exchange pricing, production, and marketing data); Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-604, 607-623 (1976) (empowering the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to enter into marketing agreements with associations of producers); Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976) (permitting agricultural coopera-
tives to return net earnings and surplus to their members, producers, and consumers in pro-
portion to their purchases or sales).
19 See note 4 sura.
20 See Note, supra note 10, at 354 (suggesting that Congress enacted § 6 based on the
labor component in agriculture, unaware of the implications of the exemption for agricultural
cooperatives). See general'y 51 CONG. REC. 11163, 11673, 11845, 12130 (1914). Because the
labor component of agriculture has been replaced to a large extent by machinery, "[t]he
fundamental premise of section 6 does not retain its vitality today." Note, supra note 10, at
355. Moreover, "[i]f the literal words of section 6's strongest proponents are to be heeded ['the
only organizations which should be excluded from the operation of the antitrust laws are
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history concerning the agricultural cooperative provision in section six
indicates that Congress itself was unsure of the scope of its enactment. 2 '
It does appear, however, that Congress did not intend to remove agricul-
tural cooperatives completely from the reach of the antitrust laws.22
This limited exemption proved insufficient. Section six failed to
elucidate those activities in which agricultural cooperatives could legiti-
mately engage23 and made no provision to protect cooperatives with
capital stock. The inadequacy of the statute, coupled with the decline
in farm prices after World War I and increased use of the cooperative
form, prompted demands in the early 1920s that Congress broaden the
scope of the exemption.24
These pressures resulted in the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act
of 1922.25 Hailed as agriculture's "Magna Carta, ' '26 the Capper-Vol-
stead Act sought to clarify the scope of activities that agricultural coop-
eratives could undertake.2 7 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the
Capper-Volstead Act, like that of section six of the Clayton Act, is a
confusing combination of contradictory statements and reports. 28
those where labor is the basis. . . .'], the basis of the exemption has dissolved." Id. (quoting
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1914) (footnote omitted)).
21 Saunders, supra note 12, at 37-40. During the debate on § 6, Representative Volstead
remarked how "very unfortunate" it was that § 6 was being written without "anybody [know-
ing] definitely just what it means.. . . We ought to know what we are voting for." 51
CONG. REC. 9564 (1914). The statements of several Congressmen reveal this confusion. See
id. at 9545 (remarks of Rep. MacDonald); id. at 9456 (remarks of Rep. Quinn); Saunders,
supra note 12, at 38-39.
22 See 51 CONG. Rac. at 9567 (remarks of Rep. Webb: "Now, I will say frankly to my
friend that we never intended to make any organizations, regardless of what they might do,
exempt in every respect from the [antitrust] law.").
23 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
24 1977 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10; Note, supra note 6, at 64; Note, s.upra note 10, at 356.
25 See note 4 supra. Both Houses of Congress had passed earlier versions (in 1919), but
conferees could not agree on whether the Secretary of Agriculture or the Federal Trade Com-
mission would have enforcement jurisdiction under the antiprice enhancement section (sec-
tion two) of the proposed legislation. They also failed to concur on whether the law would
include a proviso prohibiting monopolization. See Hearings on S. 4314 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciaq,, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
26 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union, 325 U.S. 797, 804 (1945).
27 Note, supra note 6, at 65.
28 Compare H.R. REP. No. 24,67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921) ("In the event that [coopera-
tives] authorized by this bill shall do anything forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act, they
will be subject to the penalties imposed by that law. It is not sought to place these associa-
tions above the law. . . 2") with 62 CoNG. Rac. 2050 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Kellogg:
We found that the individual manufacturer and merchant was not in a posi-
tion to place his products in foreign markets without cooperation with other
producers. . . so that in the interest of the trade and commerce of this coun-
try it was proper to allow them to combine into selling agencies...
[Tihe farmer is in very much the same position. . . . His means and his
opportunities are not sufficient to allow him to take any steps whatever in
placing his products with the ultimate consumer. . ..).
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B. Judicial Interpretations of the Exemption
Several courts have acknowledged the limitations of the agricul-
tural cooperative exemption and often have endowed agricultural coop-
eratives with rights and responsibilities similar to those of business
corporations. 29 Litigation involving the agricultural cooperative exemp-
tion is rare, however, and most of the relevant cases are of recent vin-
tage.30 The Supreme Court has construed the exemption,3 1 and lower-
courts have applied the resultant distinction between two types of agri-
cultural cooperative activity: activities "below" the cooperative level,
which are exempt from the antitrust laws, and activities "on" the coop-
erative level, which are not exempt.3 2
Activities "below" the cooperative level include marketing agree-
ments between farmers and cooperatives and joint marketing contracts
among affiliated cooperatives. Thus, in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &
Smith Citrus Prodq'ts Co. ,33 the Supreme Court had to decide whether an
agreement in restraint of trade between legally distinct cooperatives is
forbiddeh under sections one and two of the Sherman Act.3 4 The Court
ruled that if the cooperatives function as a single enterprise and the legal
distinctions between them are of minimal operational importance, such
inter-enterprise conspiracies are exempt from liability under the anti-
trust laws. 35
29 1977 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; see Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960) ("[Ihe general philosophy of [the Clayton and Capper-
Volstead Acts] was simply that individual farmers should be given, through agricultural co-
operatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive advantage---and responsibility-
available to businessmen acting through corporations as entities.").
30 One possible explanation is that until 1929, the Department of Justice lacked suffi-
cient funds to bring such actions because of provisions in the appropriation bills providing
that "no part of this appropriation shall be expended for the prosecution of [farmers] and
associations of farmers who cooperate and organize.. . to obtain and maintain a fair and
reasonable price for their products." See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1927, ch. 189, 44 Stat. 1194; Act
of June 23, 1913, ch. 3, 38 Stat. 53.
During the period in which only § 6 of the Clayton Act was in effect, only one case
interpreted its scope. In United States v. King, 250 F. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), an association of
potato shippers accused of restraining trade sought unsuccessfully to gain immunity under
§ 6. The court, holding that the association did not qualify as a cooperative, stated in dictum
that § 6 meant "that organizations such as it describes are not to be dissolved and broken up
as illegal, nor held to be combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade; but they are not
privileged to adopt methods of carrying on their business which are not permitted to other
lawful associations." 250 F. at 910.
31 See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962);
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v.
Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939). See general'y notes 32-45 and accompanying text infra.
32 See Note, supra note 10, at 368.
33 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
34 Id. at 28-29.
35 Id. See aLso Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d
203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974) (conspiracy between two potato grower bar-
gaining associations to restrain trade in marketing potatoes exempt activity); United States v.
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Courts have struck down two types of activities that may be charac-
terized as "on" the cooperative level. In United States v. Borden,36 the
Supreme Court held that anticompetitive arrangements and agreements
between agricultural cooperatives and non-cooperative entities, activi-
ties "on" the cooperative level,3 7 violate section one of the Sherman
Act.38 In addition, the Court determined that the Capper-Volstead Act
does not condone combinations involving non-farmers.3 9
The second type of nonexempt condhict on the cooperative level
involves the use of coercive or predatory practices.4 In Magland & Vir-
ginia Milk Producers Association v. United States,41 the government brought
a civil action against an agricultural marketing association consisting of
2,000 dairy farmers, a group that accounted for 86% of the milk
Maryland Coop. Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956) (conspiracy between
two dairy cooperatives to fix milk prices exempt activity).
36 308 U.S. 188 (1939). Borden was the first case concerning the agricultural cooperative
antitrust exemption to reach the Supreme Court.
37 Note, supra note 10, at 368.
38 308 U.S. at 199-203. The case involved a conspiracy among milk distributors, labor
unions, a trade association, government officials, and agricultural cooperatives to maintain
the price of milk at artificially high levels in the Chicago milk market.
39 The right of these agricultural producers thus to unite in preparing for
market and in marketing their products, and to make the contracts which are
necessary for that collaboration, cannot be deemed to authorize any combina-
tion or conspiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these producers
may see fit to devise.
Id. at 204-05. The prohibition extends to combinations with other cooperatives, which have
non-"farmer" members, as the term was understood in 1922. See National Broiler Marketing
Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
The Court also interpreted § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act. The cooperative had
claimed that no prosecution could be brought until the Secretary of Agriculture took action.
See note 4 supra. The Court held that the powers given to the Secretary of Agriculture did not
preclude other administrative review of litigation but were only auxiliary powers:
But as § I cannot be regarded as authorizing the sort of conspiracies between
producers and others that are charged in this indictment, the qualifying pro-
cedure for which § 2 provides is not to be deemed to be designed to take the
place of, or to postpone or prevent, prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act
for the purpose of punishing such conspiracies.
308 U.S. at 206. No proceeding has ever been commenced under § 2 of the Act against a
cooperative for undue price-enhancement. Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement Under the Secreltaes of
Agrfculture and Commerce, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1623, 1634 (1980).
40 Note, supra note 10, at 371.
41 362 U.S. 458 (1960). Maland & Virginia represents the culmination of a 12 year
struggle between the government and the cooperative. The Justice Department commenced
an action in 1948, but it was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case
without comment. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 335 U.S. 802
(1948). The circuit court found the cooperative guilty, 179 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1949), and the
Court denied certiorari, 338 U.S. 831 (1949). In 1950, the Justice Department brought a
successful suit alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1951). A third suit was instituted in 1956. United
States v. Maryland Coop. Milk Producers, 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956). Two years later
the government filed an omnibus complaint, which was the forerunner of the 1960 Supreme
Court case.
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purchased by milk dealers in the Washington, D.C. area.42 The govern-
ment charged the cooperative with violating sections two and three of
the Sherman Act and section seven of the Clayton Act.4 3 The evidence
indicated that the cooperative association had tried to enhance its mar-
ket position by interfering with non-members' milk shipments, attempt-
ing to foreclose the only market available to non-members, and coercing
competing dairies to obtain their Knilk from member producers.44 The
Supreme Court held that these anticompetitive activities were "so far
outside the 'legitimate objects' of a cooperative that, if proved, they
would constitute clear violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act. . ...45
Courts subsequently have held that cooperatives violate section two by
engaging in boycotts and concerted refusals to deal,46 unilateral refusals
to sell,47 and various other predatory acts.48 Until recently, however, no
42 362 U.S. at .460.
43 Id. at 460-61. The government also had charged the cooperative association with
monopolizing and attempting to monopolize commerce in fluid milk in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Relying on Borden, the district court had dismissed this charge on the ground
that the government had failed to show joint activities with non-agricultural entities. United
States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1958), afd in
part and re'din part, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). The Supreme Court reversed on this issue, holding
that Borden did not preclude § 2 actions against agricultural cooperatives. 362 U.S. at 462-63;
see note 45 and accompanying text infta.
44 362 U.S. at 468.
45 Id. The Court stated that although it was not confronted with charges under § 2 of
the Sherman Act in Borden,
we do not believe that Congress intended to immunize cooperatives engaged
in competition-stifling practices from prosecution under the antimonopoliza-
tion provisions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, while making them responsible for
such practices as violations of the antitrade-restraint provisions of §§ 1 and 3
of that Act.
Id. at 463.
46 See, e.g., Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968), cer4
denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973); Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 388 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1967); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on othergrounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
47 See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 15-18
(9th Cir. 1960), reo'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
48 See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449,451 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'don other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (interference with supply contracts between proces-
sors and nonaffliated producers and "restrictive tying contracts"); North Tex. Producers
Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189, 193-96 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977
(1966) (predatory exercise of monopoly power); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated
Milk Prods., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (unreasonably restrictive mem-
bership and marketing agreements); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers,
241 F. Supp. 476, 486-88 (E.D. Mo. 1965), afd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966) (discriminatory
pricing).
Courts have not, however, always defined "predatory" consistently. The Supreme Court
has stated that an agricultural cooperative must not "achieve monopoly by preying on in-
dependent producers." Maryland &Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
467 (1960). The Tenth Circuit has remarked that "[t]he term [predatory] probably does not
have a well-defined meaning in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister conno-
tation." Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.
1975). Professor Sullivan has observed:
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court had determined whether agricultural cooperatives are liable under
section two of the Sherman Act in the absence of evidence of predatory
behavior.
II
FAIRDALE FARms, INC. V YANxKEE MzL, INC.
The Second Circuit reached this issue in Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee
Milk, Inc. 49 Yankee Milk and six other regional cooperatives formed
Regional Cooperative Marketing Agency, Inc. (RCMA) in 1973 to fix
milk prices.50 Fairdale Farms objected to paying the prices fixed by
RCMA, which generally were higher than the minimum prices set by
the federal government, 51 and brought suit against Yankee Milk and
RCMA in 1976 charging the defendants with price-fixing, monopoliz-
ing, and attempting to monopolize. 52 The district court dismissed the
price-fixing charge and upheld the monopolization charge for trial,53
relying on the test established by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Predatory business conduct can be defined as conduct which has the pur-
pose and effect of advancing the actor's competitive position, not by improv-
ing the actor's market performance, but by threatening to injure or injuring
actual or potential competitors, so as to drive or keep them out of the market,
or force them to compete less effectively. The earliest cases labeled predatory
conduct as a violation of Section 2 when it was used to gain or hold monopoly
power; the predatory monopolist became a figure in the National
demonology.
There has been much talk about predatory behavior, but few efforts to
analyze it. Businessmen and judges think they know it when they see it.
Economists tend to doubt that it occurs, at least very often, because it is likely
to cost the firm using it more than can be gained from it.
There will be something odd, something jarring or unnatural seeming
about it. It will not strike the informed observer as normal business conduct,
as honestly industrial.
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 236, at 108-12 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
Conversely, as a district court has recently noted, "[t]here is a trend toward stretching
the word predatory so as to let it include less pejorative conduct; for instance, conduct may be
classified predatory if it evidences an intent unnecessarily; unreasonably; or illegally; to ex-
clude a competitor from a market." Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp.
608, 631 n.31 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (citations omitted).
49 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981).
50 Id. at 1038-39. Yankee Milk and the other regional cooperatives had decided that the
minimum dairy prices set by the United States for the Northeast were not providing an ade-
quate return to farmers. Id. at 1038.
51 The government is authorized by the Agriculture Marketing Agreements Act of 1937,
7 U.S.C. § 608c(s)(1976), to set minimum daily prices.
52 635 F.2d at 1039. Defendants invoked the Capper-Volstead Act as an affirmative
defense to both charges. Id.
53 Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,029, at
77,120 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 1979), aJ'd inpart and re,'d infpart, 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981). In upholding the monopoly charge, the district court stated that
"a plaintiff claiming an agricultural cooperative has violated section 2 [of the Sherman Act]
has no greater burden than if he sued a corporation." Id. at 77,117.
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Crinnell Corp.54 The Grinnell test provides:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monoply power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.55
The Second Circuit, although affirming the district court's dismissal of
the price-fixing charge,56 disagreed with the district court's application
of Grinnell and ordered the district court to dismiss the section two
charge unless on remand Fairdale Farms could show predatory acts
committed by Yankee Milk.5
7
The Second Circuit's analysis of the monopolization charge was
based on the premise that an inherent conflict exists between section two
of the Sherman Act and the Capper-Volstead Act.58 After considering
the history of agricultural cooperatives and pertinent statutory provi-
sions, the court concluded that "agricultural cooperatives were 'a favor-
ite child of Congressional policy.' ,,59 The court then considered cases
that have held agricultural cooperatives guilty of predatory acts and un-
lawful monopolization6 ° The Second Circuit concluded from these
cases that the district court had applied an inappropriate test for mo-
nopolization,6' and that agricultural cooperatives violate section two of
54 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
55 Id. at 570-71.
56 635 F.2d at 1040-45. The Second Circuit properly affirmed the dismissal of the price-
fixing charge in light of the legislative history and judicial interpretations of the Capper-
Volstead Act. See note 29 and accompanying text supra; note 67 and accompanying text in fa.
See also Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466 (1960);
Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 630 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Hiat Grain &
Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 504 (D. Kan. 1978), a f'd, 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir.
1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); North Cal. Supermarkets v. Central Cal. Lettuce
Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp. 984, 989-94 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afd, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
57 635 F.2d at 1045.
58 Id. at 1040. The Second Circuit also stated that the district court had "[d]isregard[ed]
the fundamental differences between a cooperative and a corporation." Id. Yet both Yankee
Milk and RCMA were corporations. Id. at 1038-39.
59 Id. at 1043 (quoting 5 H. TOULMIN, ANTI-TRuST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 6.1, at 334 (1950)).
60 635 F.2d at 1043-44; see Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420,
423-24 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973) (discriminatory pricing); Otto Milk Co.
v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 388 F.2d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 1967) (picketing and harass-
ment); North Tex. Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189, 195-96 (5th Cir.
1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966) (boycotts); Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n
v. United States, 236 F.2d 658, 665 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956) (coerced
membership).
61 Section two monopolization law is in disarray, primarily because of two competing
theories regarding the nature of the offense: the power theory and the abuse theory. Gnnell
represents the power theory, under which the existence of monopoly power is the essence of
the offense. Accordingly, a defendant is liable under 6Vnnell if it possesses monopoly power;,
liability is avoided only with proof that the defendant inadvertently acquired its monopoly
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the Sherman Act only if they engage in predatory acts.62
The court based this result on the conclusion that the Capper-Vol-
stead Act immunizes agricultural cooperatives from the full application
of the second element of the Gri'nell test.63 The court apparently as-
sumed that the formation and growth of agricultural cooperatives inevi-
tably involve the willful acquisition of power, and therefore that
Capper-Volstead protection was directed toward such activity.64
III
ANALYSIS
-Three factors militate strongly against the Second Circuit's treat-
ment of the agricultural cooperative antitrust exemption. First, the leg-
islative history of the exemption does not suggest that Congress had any
intention to allow cooperatives to monopolize, but rather that the legis-
lators' purpose was to allow only the unimpeded formation of agricul-
tural cooperatives. Second, judicial interpretation of the Capper-
Volstead Act lends support to this narrow construction of the exemp-
tion, rather than to the Second Circuit's distinction between agricultural
position. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass.
1953), aj'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). In contrast, the abuse theory regards the abuse
of monopoly as the essence of the offense. The defendant is liable if it wrongly acquired or
abused its monopoly power. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aj'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See general'y Note, Monopolization Under
Section 2 of the Sheman Act, 22 S.C.L. REv. 344, 350-73 (1970). "[C]ourts have oscillated be-
tween the two extremes in applying [section two of] the [Sherman] Act." Id. at 345.
62 635 F.2d at 1045. The Second Circuit remanded because it was not clear whether the
district court had denied the defendants' § 2 motion for summary judgment on the ground
that predatory acts had been shown or on the premise that the plaintiff would only have to
meet the Gr'nnell monopolization test. Id.
63 Id. at 1045. Since Fairdal Farms, two courts have followed the Second Circuit's hold-
ing that cooperatives are not subject to the same test for unlawful monopolization as are
business corporations. In Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga.
1981), a dairy processor brought a civil-antitrust action against a milk marketing association,
alleging that the association had attempted to monopolize the supply of raw milk in Georgia.
Id. at 611-12, 624. The court unquestioningly followed Fairdale Fams and required a showing
of predatory acts on the part of the marketing association to establish a § 2 violation. Id. at
631-32. The defendant, however, did not monopolize, even under the Gnnnell test. See id. at
643 ("[E]ven if Capper-Volstead did not apply, [the defendant] did not monopolize, lacking
monopoly power in the relevant geographic market. .. 2).
In GVF Cannery, Inc. v. California Tomato Growers Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal.
1981), agricultural cooperatives allegedly conspired to monopolize tomato canning and to-
mato products. Id. at 713. The court, following Fairdale Fams, failed to undertake an in-
dependent analysis of the exemption and its interpretation. See id. at 714-15. The court
erroneously cited Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19
(1962), a case dealing with activities "below" the cooperative level, in support of its proposi-
tion that (absent predatory acts) cooperatives could monopolize-activity "on" the coopera-
tive level. 511 F. Supp. at 715; see notes 32-35 and accompanying text mpra. The Sixth
Circuit recently rejected the Fardale Farms standard in the analogous context of an attempt to
monopolize charge. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); see notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
64 635 F.2d at 1045.
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cooperatives and corporations under section two of the Sherman Act.
Third, the current status of agricultural cooperatives in the economy
suggests that after formation, they should be treated no differently
under the antitrust laws from corporations.
A. Legislative Histoy
The legislative history of the agricultural cooperative exemption re-
flects no congressional intent to allow cooperatives to monopolize.65 Al-
though the Fairdale Farms court posited that "Capper-Volstead gives
farmers the. right to combine into cooperative monopolies," 66 the re-
marks of one of the sponsors of the Act suggests only an intent to allow
the formation of agricultural cooperatives. 67
The language of the statutory provisions supports this interpreta-
tion of Congress's intent. Section six of the Clayton Act states that the
antitrust laws shall neither forbid the "existence and operation" of non-
profit agricultural organizations without capital stock, nor forbid such
organizations from carrying out their legitimate objectives.68 In addi-
tion, such organizations are not to be held illegal combinations or con-
65 "The legislative history of Capper-Volstead exudes disapproval of monopoly and mo-
nopolistic practices." Note, supra note 10, at 375.
66 635 F.2d at 1040.
67 [The bill] aims to authorize cooperative associations among farmers for
the purpose of marketing their products ...
The objection made to these organizations at present is that they violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act, and that is upon the theory that each farmer is a
separate business entity. When he combines with his neighbor for the purpose
of securing better treatment in the disposal of his crops, he is charged with a
conspiracy or combination contrary to the Sherman Antitrust Act. ... The
object of this bill is to modify the laws under which business organizations are
now formed, so that farmers may take advantage of the form of organization
that is used by business concerns. It is objected in some quarters that this
repeals the Sherman Antitrust Act as to farmers. That is not true any more
than it is true that a combination of two or three corporations violates the act.
Such combinations may or may not monopolize or restrain trade.
61 CONG. REc. 1033 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Volstead). See also H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921) ("In the event that [cooperatives] authorized by this bill shall do
anything forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act, they will be subject to the penalties im-
posed by that law. It is not sought to place these associations above the law. .... "); 62
CONG. REc. 2057 (1922) (The purpose of the Capper-Volstead Act is "to give to the farmer
the same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by corporations.') (remarks of
Sen. Capper).
68 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). The language in § 6 (and in the Capper-Volstead Act) is not
framed in the unequivocal terms of antitrust immunity that Congress has used in other ex-
emptions. See, e.g., Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) (amended 1980) ("Every
agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section. . . shall be excepted from
the provisions of the [Sherman] Act, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto
... "); Act of May 26, 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976) ("Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman
Act] shall apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, [and other
educational or charitable] institutions not operated for profit."); Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1384 (Supp. 1979) ("[Ihe board may . .. exempt any person affected by such
order from the operations of the 'anti-trust laws' . . . ).
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spiracies in restraint of trade.69 Congress appears to have intended
section six simply.to give agricultural cooperatives the legal right to exist
and operate. 70
Congress's economic justification for the Capper-Volstead Act was
its belief that, in the antitrust context, agriculture is distinct from ordi-
nary businesses.71 Section one of the Act therefore provides that farmers
may associate in corporate or noncorporate form, with or without capi-
tal stock, for the purposes of processing, preparing, handling, and mar-
keting the products of their members or persons engaged in
agriculture. 72 Agricultural cooperatives may employ common market-
ing agencies and make "-necessary contracts and agreements" to carry
out such activities, provided they meet certain organizational require-
ments set forth in the statute. 73 Congress apparently intended these per-
mitted activities to guarantee farmers the right to form agricultural
cooperatives, but once formed, they were to be treated the same as other
business corporations under the antitrust laws. 74
69 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976): see note 4 supra. The Fairdale Farms court ignored the impact of
§ 6 of the Clayton Act on agricultural cooperatives. See 635 F.2d at 1041.
70 "[AIll doubt should be removed as to the legality of the existence and operations of
these organizations. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1913); S. REP. No.
698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1913).
Some commentators suggest Congress designed § 6 to prevent the application of the per
se rules of antitrust law to agricultural cooperatives, see Hufstedler, A Prediction The Exemption
Favoring Agricultural Cooperatives Will Be Reajtwmed, 22 AD. L. REv. 455, 458 (1970), and man-
dated the application of the rule of reason in determining whether cooperatives are unlawful.
Saunders, supra note 12, at 36.
71 Note, supra note 10, at 357-59 (arguing that this premise is subject to challenge today
because of the structural changes that have occurred in agriculture since the 1920s).
72 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976); see note 4 supra. The value of members' products in which the
cooperative deals must exceed the value of nonmembers' products. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
73 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976). One commentator describes the nature of the exemption in
the following example:
Assume .. .that separate producers of oranges throughout a large orange
growing region were to market their own output and were to meet together
each season as independent producers to agree upon the price they would
accept for oranges of different grades. That conduct, on its face, would be a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. Suppose, now, that instead of agreeing on
price directly the producers organize a cooperative to which they supply their
oranges and which sets the price for and sells the oranges; that conduct is
exempt.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, § 236, at 721 (footnotes omitted).
74 H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921) ("In the event that [cooperatives]
authorized by this bill shall do anything forbidden by the Sherman Antitrust Act, they will be
subject to the penalties imposed by that law. It is not sought to place these associations above
the law . .. "); 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 256 ("Capper-Volstead cooperatives, once
formed, are to be treated like business corporations under the antitrust laws."); see 62 CONG.
REc. 2057 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Capper: The purpose of the Act is "to give the farmer the
same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by corporations.'); 61 CONG. REc.
1039 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Volstead: "It is objected in some quarters that this [Act] repeals
the Sherman Antitrust Act as to farmers. That is not true anymore than it is true that a
combination of two or three corporations violates the act. Such combinations may or may
not monopolize or restrain trade.'). See also Noakes, supra note 18, at 11 ("The Clayton and
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Because the Senate considered and rejected an amendment to the
Act 75 that would have declared explicitly that cooperatives were not au-
thorized to create monopolies, commentators have argued that Congress
intended cooperatives not to be held liable under section two of the
Sherman Act.76 Congress's reasons for rejecting the amendment, how-
ever, do not support such a conclusion. The main proponent of the
amended version of the bill proposed by the Judiciary Committee stated
that it was "our purpose to relieve these associations from all possible
risk of being prosecuted under section 1 of the [Sherman] Act, but not
under section 2." 77 Many Senators voiced their opposition to the
amended version because they feared courts might interpret violations
of section two of the Sherman Act as also being violations of section one,
thereby "render[ing] nugatory the purposes intended to be attained by
the original bill."78 In addition, several Senators argued that it was im-
Capper-Volstead Acts did not--singly or together--create an absolute antitrust immunity for
cooperatives. At best, they expressed a policy of Congress to permit, without legal harass-
ment, the formation and operation of cooperative associations of farmers.").
The Fairdal Fam court engaged in almost no review of the legislative history of the
Capper-Volstead Act. Se 635 F.2d at 1042-43. Yet the court still concluded that Congress
"did not intend to prohibit the voluntary and natural growth that agricultural cooperatives
needed to accomplish their assigned purpose of effective farmer representation." Id. at 1043.
This conclusion was based primarily on Congress's rejection of an amendment to the Capper-
Volstead Act that would have prohibited cooperative monopolization and a statement by
Senator Capper that "no association can efficiently operate that does not control and handle
a substantial part of a given commodity in the locality where it operates." Id. (quoting 62
CONG. REc. 2058 (1922)). Reliance on Congress's rejection of the antimonopolization amend-
ment is misplaced, see notes 75-81 and accompanying text infra, and "substantial" does not
necessarily include a monopoly.
75 The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed the amendment to the House version of
the bill. It provided:
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to authorize the creation of or
attempt to create a monopoly, or to exempt any association organized hereun-
der from any proceedings instituted under the act entitled "An act to create a
Federal trade commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other pur-
poses," approved September 26, 1914, on account of unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce.
62 CONG. REC. 2280 (1922). The Senate rejected the proposal by a vote of 56 to 5. Id. at
2281.
76 See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 375-76. The Fairdale Fans court also placed weight on
this fact. See 635 F.2d at 1043. But cf. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458, 463 (1960) ("[W]e do not believe that Congress intended to immunize
cooperatives. . . from prosecution under. . . § 2 of the Sherman Act . 2).
77 62 CONG. Rac. 2123 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
78 , Id. at 2218 (remarks of Sen. Sterling). See also id. at 2218-19 (remarks of Sen. Ster-
ling); id. at 2220 (remarks of Sen. Lenroot); id. at 2221 (remarks of Sen. Cummins). Thus, if
courts held that the same facts that demonstrate a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act also
demonstrate a violation of § 1, cooperatives could be held to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade. The fact that such an interpretation would "render nugatory
the purpose" of the Act also suggests that Congress was interested only in allowing the forma-
tion and existence of agricultural cooperatives. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
Senator Walsh attempted to convince the Senate that the construction it was giving the
Sherman Act would make its second section meaningless and mere surplusage. 62 CONG.
19821
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possible for farmers to monopolize. 79 Thus, the belief that the an-
timonopolization version of the Act would allow prosecutions against
the very existence of cooperatives80 under section two of the Sherman
Act, coupled with the opinion that cooperatives could not monopolize
commerce, resulted in the failure to include a declaration against coop-
erative monopolization in the Capper-Volstead Act. 81
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Agricultural Cooperative Exemption
Courts have consistently recognized the limited nature of the agri-
cultural cooperative antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court has
stated that it believes the purpose of section six of the Clayton Act and
the Capper-Volstead Act is simply to allow farmers to act together in
agricultural cooperatives without the cooperative being held an illegal
restraint on trade.82 Courts also have indicated that once formed, an
agricultural cooperative is to be treated the same as business corpora-
tions under the antitrust laws, including possible violations of section
two of the Sherman Act.83
REc. 2226 (1922). Courts, of course, have not so construed the Act. See, e.g., Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
79 "[lit is not claimed, Lbelieve, by anyone opposing this bill that it is possible for the
farmers in this country to monopolize farm products generally." 62 CONG. RE. 2053 (1922)
(remarks of Sen. Kellogg). "You can not possibly organize a monopoly of wheat growers, you
can not organize a monopoly of cotton growers, you can not organize a combination of hay
growers [or] potato growers that will constitute a monopoly in interstate commerce ... " Id.
at 2123 (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
80 The primary purpose of the Act was to prevent such prosecution. See notes 29, 67 &
74 and accompanying text supra. See also Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk
Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D. Tex. 1972) ("The purpose of [the cooperative
exemption] is to make it clear that [cooperatives] are not illegal per se .... " (emphasis in
original)).
81 Senator Sterling, an opponent of the antimonopolization version of the bill, stated
that he
understood from the Senator from Montana [Mr. Walsh] that he construed
the House bill as in terms and expressly authorizing the creation of a monop-
oly. I can not agree with that. If there is a monopoly, however, or if there is
an agreement which it is feared might be in restraint of trade to such an
extent as to unduly enhance prices, the public, which is injured or any person
believing the public to be injured, may make complaint.
62 CONG. Rac. 2219 (1922). Senator Walsh was the primary supporter of the antimono-
polization version of the bill.
82 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 465 (1960)
("The language shows no more than a purpose to allow farmers to act together in cooperative
associations without the associations as such being 'held or construed to be illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws,' as they otherwise might
have been.").
83 We believe it is reasonably clear from the very language of the Capper-Vol-
stead Act, as it was in § 6 of the Clayton Act, that the general philosophy of
both was simply that individual farmers should be given, through agricultural
cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive advantage---and
responsibility-available to businessmen acting through corporations as enti-
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None of the cases that the Second Circuit cited in support of its
proposition that cooperatives violate section two of the Sherman Act
only if they engage in predatory practices were predicated on a finding
of predatory practices.8 4 Furthermore, one court has ruled that "[a] co-
operative can lose its exemption if it monopolizes, or attempts to monop-
olize, or engages in 'predatory practices,' "85 and has applied the same
test for unlawful monopolization to cooperatives as is applied to
corporations.8 6
ties. ... This indicates a purpose to make it possible for farmer-producers to
organize together, set association policy, fix prices at which their cooperative
will sell their produce, and otherwise carry on like a business corporation
without thereby violating the antitrust laws. It does not suggest a congres-
sional desire to vest cooperatives with unrestricted power to restrain trade or
to achieve monopoly....
Id. at 466-67. Se also North Tex. Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966):
[F]armers may act together in a cooperative association, and the legitimate ob-
jecls of mutual help may be carried out by the association without contraven-
ing the antitrust laws, but that otherwise, the association acts as an entity
with the same responsibility under section 2 of the Sherman Act as if it were a
private business corporation.
Id. at 194 (emphasis in original); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Produ-
cers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (The agricultural cooperative exemption
is intended "to give farmers the opportunity to compete as entities in the same fashion as
business corporations.").
The strongest statement that cooperatives are exempt from § 2 of the Sherman Act oc-
curs in Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass.
1954). In that case, the trial judge charged the jury that "it is not a violation of the Sherman
Act or any other anti-trust act for a Capper-Vostead cooperative to acquire a large, even a
100 per cent, position in a market if it does it solely through those steps which involve cooper-
ative purchasing and cooperative selling." Id. at 907. The court, however, appears only to
have been pointing out that monopoly power alone is insufficient to violate § 2. In the very
next paragraph, the court states that "it would be a violation of the law, and.. . a prohib-
ited monopolization for a person or group of persons to seek to secure a dominant share of the
market through a restraint of trade which was prohibited, or through a predatory prac-
tice ...... " Id. (emphasis added).
84 See Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1972); Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 388 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1967); North Tex. Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966). As the district court in Fairdale Fams stated,
"proof of predatory practices adds substantial weight to a plaintiff's monopoly claim, but...
it is [not] a necessary element." Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 163,029, at 77,116 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 1979), afdin part and rev'din part, 635 F.2d 1037 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981).
85 Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 216
(9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
86 Id. In Treasure Valle, the defendants were charged with monopolizing the potato
processing market in Idaho and Oregon. The Ninth Circuit measured the defendants' con-
duct against the two elements set forth in Crinnell. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text
supra. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish either element. 497 F.2d at
209-10.
In Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976), the Ninth Circuit again indicated that the Grnnell
standard is the appropriate one by which to evalute a cooperative's conduct when charged
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Finally, in the analogous situation involving a charge of attempt to
monopolize,8 7 one court recently rejected the Fairdale Farnms standard.
In United States v. Daiymen, Inc. ,88 the Sixth Circuit rejected a standard
that would have held agricultural cooperatives liable for attempting to
monopolize only if they engaged in predatory conduct.89 Instead, the
court ordered the application of the same standard as is used to measure
the conduct of ordinary business corporations. 9°
C. A Proposal
The current status of agricultural cooperatives in the economy sug-
gests that they should be treated no differently from corporations. Co-
operatives had little economic power in the early 1900s, 91 and one of the
purposes of the antitrust exemption may have been to equalize their
bargaining power with corporations. 92 Today, however, cooperatives
have achieved that equality.93 Therefore, that purpose of protection is
outdated.94 In fact, a recent national commission expressed concern
over the monopoly potential of cooperatives, 95 stating that "[a] compel-
with violating § 2 of the Sherman Act. The court held that it was within the jury's province
to find the defendants guilty of violating § 2 in part because they were properly instructed as
to the elements of the offense enunciated in Gin'mell. Id. at 1203.
87 Section two of the Sherman Act also includes the offense of attempting to monopolize.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The elements of the offense of attempting to monopolize are (1) that the
defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct (2) with specific intent to monopolize, and
(3) a dangerous probability that the attempt would succeed exists. Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
88 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The defendant was charged with attempt-
ing to monopolize the market in grade A milk in the southeastern United States. Id. at 193.
The district court had held "that the Capper-Volstead Act . .. exempt [sic] agricultural
cooperatives from liability for attempts to monopolize unless their anticompetitive conduct is
deemed 'predatory.' "Id. at 194.
89 Id. The court rejected this standard because it sets "too high a burden." Id.
90 See id. at 194-95.
91 In 1920, 32 million farmers operated approximately 6.5 million farms. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 584-85 (94th ed. 1973). "[E]arly-twentieth-century
American farming epitomized the pure competition model." Note, supra note 10, at 352.
92 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws 306 (1955); Levi & Sporleder, Some Recent Interpretatiors of the Capper-
Volstead Act: A Legal-Economic Analysis, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 435, 439 (1978).
93 In 1977, cooperatives had combined sales of over $43,584,000. STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 704 (101st ed. 1980). Seven cooperatives were listed in the
Fortune 500 in 1978. Farmer Cooperatives 14 (July 1979). Furthermore, in 1974-1975, coopera-
tives handled about 27% of the agricultural products marketed in the United States. FARMER
COOPERATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATISTICS OF FARMER COOPERA-
TIVES v (F.C.S. Research Report 39, 1977). Regional cooperatives accounted for between
71% and 100% of sales in the following commodities in 1973: sugar (100%), tobacco (100%),
nuts (96%), livestock and products (88%), cotton and products (76%), dairy products (75%),
rice (74%), poultry products (73%), and beans and peas (71%). FARMER COOPERATION
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, COOPERATIVE GROWTH: TRENDS, COMPARISONS,
STRATEGY 25 (F.C.S. Information 87, 1973). See generaly Note, supra note 10, at 342-43.
94 See 5 H. TOULMIN, supra note 59, § 6.3, at 345; Note, supra note 10, at 355, 357.
95 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 258-60. Between 1950-1951 and 1974-1975, the
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ling case for monopoly cooperatives has yet to be made," 96 and recom-
mending that the antitrust treatment of cooperatives, once they are
formed, should parallel that accorded ordinary business corporations. 97
Cooperatives are not so dissimilar from ordinary corporations as to
justify special treatment. The primary differences are (1) that coopera-
tives may be formed with or without capital stock, and (2) that coopera-
tives generally deal with their members or shareholders, not third
parties.98 In other respects, cooperatives are similar to corporations. For
example, members or stockholders of a cooperative, like shareholders in
a business corporation, ordinarily are not liable for its debts.99 Indeed,
cooperatives today typically are organized as corporations.' 00
Courts are not precluded under the antitrust laws from treating co-
operatives and corporations similarly.' 0 ' The application of the Grinnell
test for unlawful monopolization, 0 2 which the Fairdale Farms court re-
jected, 0 3 would not burden cooperatives. The Fairdale Farms court was
concerned that the application of the Grinnell test would inhibit the
growth and operation of cooperatives. 10 4 The Grinnell test, however, ap-
number of agricultural cooperatives declined by nearly 25%. FARMER COOPERATION SERV-
ICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATISTICS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES v (F.C.S. Re-
search Report 39, 1977).
96 1979 REPORT, sufira note 2, at 260. Commentators have criticized the exemption as
being without economic justification. E.g., 5 H. TOULMIN, supra note 59, § 6.1, at 334
("[E]conomically, there seems to be no sound reason for the exemption. . . .'); Noakes, supra
note 3, at 407 ('Perhaps one of its most distinctive features is its apparent lack of justification
as being directly in the public interest.").
97 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 253.
98 LEGAL PHASES, supra note 11, at 7, 10.
99 Id. at 8. Cooperatives now obtain borrowed and equity capital from the same types of
sources as do corporations. See ECONOMICS, STATISTICS, AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE CHANGING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF FARMER COOPERA-
TIvES 67-72, 125-32 (Farmer Cooperative Research Report 17, 1980).
100 See ECONOMICS, STATISTICS, AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICUL-
TURE, THE CHANGING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 36-40 (Farmer
Cooperative Research Report 17, 1980).
101 See 5 H. TOULMIN, supra note 59, § 6.21, at 367 ('[I]t would be relevant in passing
upon the reasonableness of restraints by cooperative associations and agricultural interests to
consider exactly what is their present relative bargaining power. That is within the Courts
[5ic] power." (footnote omitted)); notes 91-97 and accompanying text supra. But see Note, supra
note 10, at 367-68 (concluding that a legislative solution is necessary). The Fairdale Farms
court also apparently thought that congressional action would be necessary. See 635 F.2d at
1045 n.7. Concededly, a drastic restriction of the law's protection in response to the changed
economic status of agricultural cooperatives should come from Congress; however, this does
not justify the Second Circuit's decision to broaden that protection.
102 See note 61; notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
103 See notes 57-62 and accompanying text supra.
104 See 635 F.2d at 1043, 1045. The district court had addressed this concern:
[The cooperatives'] fear may be real, but it does not justify affording co-
operatives different treatment than corporations under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act as well as the
cases that discuss it repeatedly demonstrate that Congress intended the Act to
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pears to require an intent to obtain a monopoly, 10 5 and the monopoliza-
tion offense preserves "the right to normal growth."' 0 6  Thus,
cooperatives would be able to seek additional members as long as they
do so without an intent to monopolize. At the same time, they would
not be able to engage in activities that do not reach the status of preda-
tory practices for the purpose of obtaining monopoly power.,0 7
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit erred in Fairdale Farms by holding that agricul-
tural cooperatives are not subject to the same test for violations of sec-
tion two of the Sherman Act as ordinary business corporations. The
legislative history of the cooperative exemption, judicial interpretations
of it, and the current economic position of agricultural cooperatives sup-
port the conclusion that cooperatives, once formed, should be treated
like other business corporations. The Second Circuit's creation of a sepa-
rate standard for cooperatives for purposes of section two violations of
the Sherman Act creates a dangerous potential for cooperative monop-
oly power.
Alan M. Anderson
put farmers on an equal footing with the corporations they faced in the mar-
ketplace, not to give them an unfair advantage.
1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,029, at 77,119 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 1979), aj'd inpart and reo'd in
part, 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981).
105 The r'znnell Court stated that unlawful monopolization requires "the wi'Ad acquisi-
tion or maintenance" of monopoly power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966) (emphasis added).
106 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 215 (D. Del. 1953),
afd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
107 The definition of "predatory practices" is unclear. See note 48 supra. Commentators
are unable to agree on a single definition. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, Williamson on predatoq
Pn'cing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatog Pztidng: A Repl , 89
HARV. L. Rav. 891 (1976); Scherer, Predatoy Pring andthe Sheman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV.
L. Rav. 869 (1976); Williamson, Williamson on Predatogi Pridng II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979);
Williamson, Predato,7 cing-: A Strategic and Wefare Ana.Asi, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977). See
generaly Brodley & Hay, supra note 9, at 741-65.
Predicating antitrust liability on a showing of predatory practices might allow a coopera-
tive to obtain a monopoly by engaging in activities that do not reach the status of predatory
practices. In addition, requiring a showing of predatory practices creates a high burden of
proof for potential plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit has rejected a district court ruling that coop-
eratives are liable for attempting to monopolize only if their conduct is predatory, in part
because such a burden is too high. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 194 (6th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Instead, the court used the same test for liability that is applicable to
other business corporations. See id. at 194-95. See also notes 87-90 and accompanying text
supra.
